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Businesses engage in a variety of practices to increase sales and
profits, often at the expense of competitors. These "unilateral practices" usually become suspect under the competition laws only when
the firm using them has what is termed "monopoly power" under U.S.
law and a "dominant position" in the European Union (EU). There is
great variation in how the courts analyze unilateral practices. The
courts have, for example, devised quite different rules for prices: compare LePage's Inc v 3M (Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co)'
with Manufacture Franqaisedes PneumatiquesMichelin v Commission
of the European Communities' (Michelin II). By the same token, plain-

tiffs face high hurdles in showing predatory pricing in U.S. law under
Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, but low
hurdles in showing tying under Jefferson Parish Hospital DistrictNo 2
v Hyde.'

This variation results in part from the reality that the welfare effects of unilateral practices are inherently difficult to assess. Econom-

ics and experience provide a strong presumption that certain coordinated practices are harmful; there is thus little variation in the analysis,
for example, of price fixing. By contrast, there is no reason to assume
that aggressive unilateral pricing is bad-quite the opposite. Still, a
firm could use low prices to secure a monopoly. Given this uncertainty,
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1 324 F3d 141, 162 (3d Cir 2003) (en banc) (holding that the "relevant inquiry is the anticompetitive effect of [a company's] exclusionary practices considered together" -regardless of
whether products are priced above cost), cert denied 124 S Ct 2932 (2004).
2
Case T-203/01, 2003 ECR (Court of First Instance Sept 30, 2003) (holding that the offering of loyalty rebates by a dominant company was inconsistent with price competition and thus
an abuse of the company's dominant position).
3
509 US 209 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff must not only prove that the defendant
priced below cost but also that the defendant had a reasonable prospect of recouping its losses
sustained during the predatory period).
4
466 US 2, 9 (1984) (discussing the presumption of unreasonableness that accompanies
certain tying arrangements).
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it is not surprising that courts have reached different conclusions. This

is hardly a satisfying outcome, especially since the differences are seldom justified in economic terms. Legal uncertainty dulls investment
and deters welfare-increasing competition.
Scholars have suggested two major approaches to antitrust analysis of unilateral practices, either of which would impose some rational-

ity and consistency. Beginning in the early 1950s, the Chicago School
argued that many unilateral practices should be per se legal for two
reasons.5 First, these practices usually create efficiencies. Second, one

can often derive "impossibility theorems" showing that firms with
monopoly power lack incentives to engage in unilateral practices that
reduce welfare.6
The post-Chicago literature used game theory to challenge the

second reason. Beginning in the early 1980s, industrial organization
specialists derived "possibility theorems" showing that certain behavior could prove anticompetitive. One might argue that those theorems
support the adoption of a rule of reason approach to the assessment

of unilateral practices by firms with market power. Thus William
Kovacic and Carl Shapiro observe:
Some types of conduct, such as long-term contracts with key customers or preemptive capacity expansion, could deter entry and
entrench dominance, but they also could generate efficiencies.
The only way to tell in a given case appeared to be for the antitrust agencies and the courts to conduct a full-scale rule of reason

inquiry.
But since the models are highly sensitive to specific assumptions and
parameter values, they do not provide much practical guidance.

This Essay offers an approach to designing rules for assessing unilateral practices based in part on the error-cost framework pioneered

5
See Peter Newman, ed, 1 The New PalgraveDictionary of Economics and the Law 22733, 601-05 (Macmillan Reference 1998) (discussing the origins of the Chicago School's antitrust
views, including the hypothesis that markets are more likely to serve the public interest than
government intervention). For a more general overview of the Chicago School antitrust literature, see generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: Remembrance of Law and Economics at
Chicago,1932-1970,26 J L & Econ 163 (1983).
6
See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself 23138 (Free Press 1993) (arguing that the concept of "foreclosure," used by courts to inform the
analysis of vertical integration, is economically unsound); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability
for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan L Rev 1445, 1472-73 (1985) ("[T]here are great inherent disincentives to [the use of boycotts and predatory pricing], and the circumstances in which they are
profitable are rare.").
7
William E. Kovacic and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy:A Century of Economic and Legal
Thinking, 14 J Econ Perspectives 43, 55 (2000).
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by Judge Frank Easterbrook.' Our approach is grounded on three
principles:
(1)
(2)

(3)

Distinguishing procompetitive from anticompetitive actions
with certainty is impossible.
Socially desirable antitrust rules would minimize the expected cost of errors resulting from condoning harmful
practices or condemning beneficial ones, while maintaining
a degree of predictability for businesses and administrative
ease for the courts.
Assessments of the likelihood and cost of errors associated
with legal rules should turn on presumptions based on current economic knowledge and experience.

We will refer to this as a neo-Chicago approach, since it (a) accepts
the Chicago tenet that legal rules can and should be assessed on their
consequences in terms of efficiency, and (b) makes use of Chicago and
post-Chicago insights in designing these rules.
In Part I, we summarize economic thinking on the antitrust consequences of unilateral behavior and its impact on the way courts and
regulators analyze such behavior. In Part II, we offer our alternative
approach. We focus (a) on the role of economic theory and evidence
in forming presumptions about the likelihood that specific unilateral
practices reduce welfare, and (b) on the implications of this approach
for the research needed to evaluate unilateral practices. In Part III, we
apply our approach to tying-one of the more unsettled areas of antitrust law concerning unilateral practices.

8 Easterbrook emphasized the importance of presumption in structuring antitrust inquiries. He observed that the full rule of reason approach is often impractical and advocates a more
structured rule of reason inquiry. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L
Rev 1, 9-14 (1984). Unlike Easterbrook, we have the benefit of over twenty years of gametheoretic industrial organization models; the results of these models make us skeptical about the
ability of economics to provide the necessary guidance for a full-blown rule of reason inquiry.
9 This error-cost approach has been applied to legal rules in general as well as antitrust in
particular. See, for example, id at 10; Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and JudicialAdministration,2 J Legal Stud 399, 400 (1973) (applying error-cost analysis to
civil, criminal, and administrative cases). For recent applications, see Keith N. Hylton and Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy:A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 Antitrust L J 469, 470
(2001) (analyzing tying in an error-cost framework and focusing on the importance of "the relative frequencies of pro- and anticompetitive conduct," as well as the likelihood of judicial error);
C. Frederick Beckner III and Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 Antitrust
L J 41, 45-49 (1999) (analyzing decisionmaking and advocating antitrust screens to reflect the
fact that courts may err when evaluating the effect of the conduct at issue).
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UNILATERAL PRACTICES: FROM PRE- TO POST-CHICAGO

"Chicago" has come to be the shorthand used by antitrust scholars to describe a temporal and intellectual dividing line. It refers to

both a way of thinking about antitrust issues and periods during which
those ways of thinking have predominated.
A. Pre-Chicago
The "pre-Chicago approach" asks whether firms have the power

to engage in anticompetitive behavior-not whether they have that
incentive." The resulting judgments typically fail to consider whether
suspect business practices result from efforts to achieve efficiencies.

The Supreme Court used this instinctive approach in many cases involving unilateral practices in the first three-quarters of the twentieth
century-a period sometimes called the pre-Chicago era in antitrust."
One major pre-Chicago contribution is the "leverage doctrine,"'2
which is behind a number of decisions condemning various unilateral
practices when used by firms with significant market power. Starting
with United States v Terminal RailroadAssociation of St. Louis,3 the

Supreme Court seemingly concluded that a firm with a monopoly in
one market always has an incentive to extend that monopoly to a
market for a complementary product in order to capture two monopoly profits instead of one. Following this reasoning, the courts found
that several unilateral practices should be illegal per se. Tying, a practice in which a firm links sales of a product in which it possesses market power to purchases of other products that could be acquired com-

10 See Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice 7 (Cambridge 2004) (describing pre-Chicago antitrust efforts as fueled "more by the desire to restrain large firms than
by the objective of increasing economic efficiency"); Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to PostChicagoAntitrust, in Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi, and Roger Van den Bergh, eds, PostChicago Developments in Antitrust Law 60, 60-64 (Edward Elgar 2002) (discussing antitrust's
classical and structural eras).
11 See, for example, Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons Co, 220 US 373 (1911)
(holding that resale price maintenance is illegal); InternationalSalt Co v United States, 332 US
392, 396 (1947) (holding that "foreclos[ing] competitors from any substantial market" is per se
illegal); United States v Yellow Cab Co, 332 US 218 (1947) (holding that a conspiracy to eliminate
competition violates the Sherman Act regardless of the amount or importance of interstate
commerce affected); Standard Oil Co v United States, 337 US 293, 314 (1949) (holding that a
practice substantially lessens competition if it can be shown that "competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected"); United States v Arnold, Schwinn
& Co, 388 US 365 (1967) (holding that the imposition of territorial restrictions on resellers is a
per se violation of the Sherman Act).
12 See, for example, Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,
67 Yale L J 19,29-32 (1957).
13 224 US 383,409-10 (1912) (reasoning that the railroad association would use its monopoly on railroad terminals in St. Louis to also monopolize interstate commerce of goods).
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petitively, was deemed inherently illegal." Another broad concern was
that manufacturers would use agreements with their distributors to
extend monopolies downstream. Thus, resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, and exclusive dealing were deemed illegal per se.5
Still, another pre-Chicago view was that firms were prone to
predatory actions to drive rivals from the market and create monopolies. Predation was considered under the rule of reason. But courts
were free to apply reason as they thought best, and defendants often
lost. 6

The Chicago School

B.

The Chicago School revolutionized antitrust by viewing a variety
of practices deemed suspicious by the courts through the lens of price
theory. It developed "impossibility theorems," which showed that, under some circumstances, it was not possible for firms to have the incentive to engage in certain practices even if they had the ability to do
so." The most famous is the "single monopoly profit theorem," which
was considered fatal (or so it appeared) to the leverage doctrine.
Economic theory shows that, under some assumptions, in a vertical chain of production, there is fixed potential for monopoly profit. A
firm with a monopoly at one level of the chain gets all of the monopoly profit if it charges a monopoly price and everyone else in the chain
charges a competitive price. Indeed, it serves the monopolist to encourage competition at every other level because any monopoly profit
earned by others will reduce its own. Variants of the single-monopolyprofit theorem have been applied to tying, essential facilities, and,
more broadly, to the analysis of vertical integration.'8
Continental T, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc,9 one of the earliest Chi-

cago-influenced Supreme Court decisions, overruled precedent by
analyzing territorial restraints imposed by manufacturers on distributhan finding them illegal per se.2tors under the rule of reason, rather
More recently, the Court has overturned the per se prohibition on a

InternationalSalt, 332 US at 396.
Dr.Miles, 220 US at 408; Schwinn, 388 US at 379; Standard Oil, 337 US at 314.
16 See, for example, Patrick Bolton, Joseph F Brodley, and Michael H. Riordan, Predatory
Pricing:Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Georgetown L J 2239, 2250 (2000) (noting that
"[p]laintiffs won most litigated cases including those they probably should have lost" before
1975).
17 See Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure,in Mark Armstrong and Rob
Porter, eds, Handbook of Industrial Organization III (Elsevier Science forthcoming 2005) (discussing how Chicago scholars questioned the economic validity of the foreclosure doctrine).
18 See Bork, The Antitrust Paradoxat 223-45 (cited in note 6).
19 433 US 36 (1977).
20
Id at 59, overruling Schwinn, 388 US 365.
14
15
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manufacturer setting the maximum price a distributor could charge. 21
Chicago-influenced Supreme Court decisions have also made predatory pricing claims difficult to pursue.2 Indeed, the period after Sylvania is sometimes described
as the "Chicago era" in antitrust.

C.

Post-Chicago Ideas and Models

In the 1980s, some economists started kicking the tires on the
Chicago results. They found that it was possible to develop models in
which a firm could use a monopoly in one market to affect adjacent
markets in ways that reduced social welfare. Michael Whinston's
seminal article on tying showed that leveraging a monopoly position
may increase monopoly profits if two necessary conditions apply. The
first is that the tied market is subject to economies of scale (and is
therefore imperfectly competitive). The second is that leveraging induces exit or deters entry in the tied market, thereby resulting in a

secure monopoly in the tied market.
Other economists subsequently identified other situations in
which a monopoly could generate more profits or protect existing
profits by foreclosing competition in a second market. 2 A further
strand of modern economics undercuts the proposition that firms had

no incentive or ability to engage in predatory pricing.
The post-Chicago approach had an impact on both U.S. and
European antitrust law. It received a limited Supreme Court imprimatur inofEastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, Inc." On a review
a summary judgment decision, the Court, in effect, rejected

21 State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3 (1997), overruling Albrecht v Herald Co, 390 US 145
(1968). Note that minimum retail price maintenance remains illegal per se.
22
See, for example, Brooke Group, 509 US at 226; United States v AMR Corp, 140 F Supp
2d 1141, 1194 (D Kan 2001) (holding that the government had not met the "high standard of
proof of a predatory pricing claim"), affd, 335 F3d 1109 (10th Cir 2003). The development of the
Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing, severely limiting successful predatory pricing claims,
was also influenced by the Chicago School. See Kitch, 26 J L & Econ at 209 (cited in note 5).
23 Michael D.Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure,and Exclusion, 80 Am Econ Rev 837 (1990).
24 See Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserveand
Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J Econ 194, 205, 212 (2002) (proposing
that tying can extend an existing monopoly into a new market, as well as preserve an existing
monopoly); Jay Pil Choi and Christodoulos Stefanadis, Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory, 32 RAND J Econ 52, 60-62 (2001) (proposing that tying by an incumbent lowers
the investment incentive of entrants, thereby lowering the probability of entry into the market).
25 See, for example, Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization361-80 (MIT 1988)
(discussing how firms can use limit pricing and predation to preclude entry-and how a firm's
reputation for engaging in such behaviors will affect how potential rivals respond). See also
Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan, 88 Georgetown L J at 2250-51 (cited in note 16) (discussing the
incentive dominant firms have to set prices below average variable cost in order to send "strategic communication involving threats and sanctions").
26
504 US 451 (1992).
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the per se legal approach in favor of a rule of reason approach that
would consider the possibility of anticompetitive behavior in light of
the factual circumstances.27
The European Commission has relied on post-Chicago arguments in several key merger cases, for example blocking a merger between Tetra Laval and Sidel .] It was concerned that the combined
entity would have the ability and incentive to use its dominance in
carton packaging "as a 'lever' in order to achieve a dominant position
on the [plastic bottle] equipment markets."29 On appeal, the Court of
First Instance accepted the possibility of such conglomerate effects
but decided that the Commission had failed to show, as a factual matter, that such anticompetitive effects were likely.
The post-Chicago literature is a collection of what we call "possibility theorems."'" In the vertical foreclosure strand of the literature,
these theorems all begin with the assumption that vertical foreclosure
does not generate any benefits such as reductions in production costs
and transaction costs, or improved convenience for consumers. 2 The
theorems are based on further assumptions about demand, cost, and
firms' strategic interactions. Finally, the theorems show that a practice
reduces social welfare if specific parameters of the model (elasticity of
This decision has been criticized from a post-Chicago perspective as relying on bad
27
economics. See Dennis W. Carlton, A GeneralAnalysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to
Deal:Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided,68 Antitrust L J 659,678-81 (2001) (arguing that in
Kodak, the Supreme Court failed to recognize the lack of an injury to consumers). See also
Motta, Competition Policy at 7 (cited in note 10); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Reckoning of PostChicago Antitrust, in Cucinotta, Pardolesi, and Van den Bergh, eds, Post-ChicagoDevelopments 1,
7-9 (cited in note 10) (discussing the irrationality of Kodak and noting that lower courts have
"bent over backwards to construe Kodak as narrowly as possible").
28 Tetra Laval BV v Commission, Case T-5/02, 2002 ECR 11-4381, 1 338 (Court of First
Instance Oct 25,2002).
Id 143.
29
30
Id IT 141,336.
31 Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics,Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J L, Econ,
& Org 95,104 (2002) (noting that such theorems have "shown that a variety of market imperfections can theoretically lead to the possibility that vertical integration and vertical contractual
restraints can enhance market power ... and as a result, lead to ... welfare losses").
32
Making such extreme assumptions to focus on a particular issue is standard in economics. Moreover, the authors are careful to note that the models should be used with great caution
for antitrust analysis and point out the omitted role of efficiencies. See Choi and Stefanadis, 32
RAND J Econ at 70 (cited in note 24) ("The debate about tying cannot be conclusive unless
formal models incorporate the aspects of the world that practitioners consider important.");
Whinston, 80 Am Econ Rev at 855-56 (cited in note 23). Unfortunately, economists and regulatory authorities sometimes ignore these caveats. See, for example, European Regulators Group,
Consultation Document on a Draft Joint ERGIEC Approach on Appropriate Remedies in the
New Regulatory Framework (Nov 21, 2003), online at http://erg.eu.int/doc/publications/
erg0330-draft-joint-approach-on-remedies.pdf (visited Dec 10, 2004). Section 1 of this report
reaches conclusions about competition policy problems with reference to some of the economic
literature but without taking into account the relevant caveats.
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demand, the magnitude of fixed costs, etc.) fall within a particular
range of values. But they are of limited practical value because the
data critical to deciding whether reality fits the models is typically unavailable.
D.

What's Next?

The Chicago and post-Chicago literatures have relied on economic theory to question the intuitions of the pre-Chicago approach.
Both literatures emphasize efficiency as the ultimate objective of antitrust and reject most pre-Chicago per se illegality rules concerning
unilateral practices. Yet where the Chicago School tended to advocate
per se legality, post-Chicago thinking enthuses over rule of reason
analyses.33 The post-Chicago literature has shown that, under some
circumstances, otherwise benign unilateral practices may reduce social
welfare. But the findings turn on assumptions that are hard to test
with available data.
We are less confident in the ability of economics to help juries,
courts, and regulators to reason their way to the right answer. As Benjamin Franklin noted, "So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable
Creature,since it enables one to find or make a Reason for every thing
one has a mind to do."4 We are, however, convinced that economic
knowledge, both theory and evidence, can provide useful guidance in
the design of administrable legal rules that (a) minimize legal uncertainty for businesses and (b) maximize consumer welfare in expected
terms. In the following Parts, we explain how these goals may be
achieved.
II. UNILATERAL PRACTICES: A NEO-CHICAGO APPROACH

Firms will get away with welfare-reducing practices if competition
policy is too lenient, and they will be discouraged from engaging in
welfare-enhancing practices if it is too strict. Sound policy must thus
begin with an assessment of the likelihood and cost of the two types of
mistakes. Policymakers must then devise rules that minimize the expected costs of these errors and make antitrust enforcement predictable for businesses.
To implement this approach, we make three presumptions-or, in
the language of Bayesian decisionmaking, we state three prior beliefs-regarding the nature, cost, and likelihood of the errors resulting
from the assessment. These prior beliefs are independent of the facts

33
34

Kovacic and Shapiro, 14 J Econ Perspectives at 57-58 (cited in note 7).
Benjamin Franklin, Writings 1339 (Viking 1987).
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of any specific case. However, they affect how we process the evidence
in each case and how we establish burdens of proof and the degree of
antitrust scrutiny. Then, based on those presumptions, we create legal
rules that minimize the likely cost of the inevitable errors.
Our three presumptions are:
(1) Many unilateral practices that have raised concerns are also
widely used in competitive markets, and therefore sometimes result in welfare-enhancing efficiency.
(2) Firms with the ability to cause consumer harm often do not
have the incentives to do so, while firms that have the incentives to engage in anticompetitive practices often do not
have the ability (monopoly power) to do so.
(3) Barring procompetitive practices is likely to be more costly,
on average, than permitting anticompetitive practices.
Below, we explain the economic reasoning behind each presumption
and weigh their implications for the design of legal rules.
A. Prior Beliefs About Efficiency
Consider a practice in which firms in both competitive and uncompetitive markets engage. We would expect that the practice cuts
costs or enhances value to consumers-after all, competitive firms
cannot survive indefinitely if they do not use the most efficient methods of producing, designing, and distributing products.
Yet nondominant firms regularly engage in unilateral practices
challenged under the antitrust laws. These include tying;" vertical restraints such as exclusive contracts and exclusive territories; " nonlinear pricing, including loyalty discounts; 3 and aggressive price cutting.Practices that generate efficiencies where firms lack market power
logically should generate those same efficiencies where firms possess
market power. There is no economic reason to believe that these efficiencies become less important as firms acquire market power. We
35
See David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence
from Competitive Markets and Implicationsfor Tying Law, 22 Yale J Reg (forthcoming 2005).
See Jan B. Heide, Shantanu Dutta, and Mark Bergen, Exclusive Dealing and Business
36
Efficiency: Evidence from Industry Practice,41 J L & Econ 387,388 (1998) (observing that manufactures such as HAagen-Dazs and Marvel have required that their distributors not carry competing products).
37 See John Temple Lang and Robert O'Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition:How
to Clarify PricingAbuses Under Article 82 EC, 26 Fordham Intl L J 83,91 (2002). See also Robert
Wilson, NonlinearPricing41-44 (Oxford 1993).
38 See Motta, Competition Policy at 443 (cited in note 10) ("[T]he alleged non-dominant
predator is just trying to increase its market share through an aggressive but lawful behavior.").
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therefore presume these practices are procompetitive, even if practiced by firms with monopoly power, unless shown otherwise.
It is not surprising that businesses have difficulty documenting
and sometimes even articulating efficiencies. In reality, businesses operate instinctively and often cannot show that their prices are profit
maximizing or that they are minimizing costs-even though we assume successful businesses gravitate toward best practices. The efficiency gains from practices such as tying and distribution agreements
are often subtle and not readily reduced to accounting numbers. For
example, David Evans and Michael Salinger show that fairly competitive midsize automobile sedan manufacturers have increasingly tied
more features to their cars." The explanation seems to be that car

manufacturers recognized that they could save money by reducing the
number of product variants. But we doubt that the car manufacturers
could prove the existence or amount of these savings to the degree
often required by the courts and regulatory agencies.
B.

Prior Beliefs on Anticompetitive Intent and Effect

The principal implication of several decades of economic investigation on the competitive effects of unilateral practices, such as exclusive dealing and tying, is that there should be no presumption on the
part of competition authorities that these practices are anticompetitive, even when undertaken by firms with monopoly power." Firms
with the ability to cause consumer harm do not often have an incentive
to do so. Anticompetitive actions aimed at excluding competitors from
adjacent markets to achieve monopoly power often result in a reduction of overall firm profits. Firms with the incentive to act anticompetitively do not often have the ability to do so, either because they do not
have the ability to pre-commit to an anticompetitive course of action
or because they cannot extract any anticompetitive rents due to the
countervailing power of buyers and/or potential entrants.
There is no economic basis, therefore, for presuming that a firm is
engaging in such practices for the purpose of maintaining or acquiring
a monopoly. That is a key result of the Chicago and post-Chicago economic literatures. Similarly, there is little reason to presume that, even
if the intent is anticompetitive, the effect will be anticompetitive. The
economics, to date, shows that conditions must be just right to leverEvans and Salinger, 22 Yale J Reg (forthcoming 2005) (cited in note 35).
See, for example, Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft- What
We Know, and Don't Know, 15 J Econ Perspectives 63 (2001); Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright, and
Jean Tirole, The Activities of a Monopoly Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences and Implications for Competition Policy (Institut d'Economie Industrielle Working
Paper Sept 2001), online at http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2001/activities.pdf (visited Dec 10, 2004).
39

40
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age a monopoly anticompetitively. We discuss these conclusions below

in the context of tying.
C. Prior Beliefs on Error Costs
Table 1 shows the standard error matrix with the shaded boxes
reflecting the two possible errors that enforcement agencies and the
judicial system can make: falsely condemning competitive practices
("false convictions") and falsely absolving anticompetitive practices
("false acquittals")." The costs of false convictions in antitrust decisions involving unilateral practices are likely to be significantly larger
than those of false acquittals. As Judge Easterbrook has observed,
"There is no automatic way to expunge mistaken decisions of the Supreme Court. A practice once condemned is likely to stay condemned,
no matter its benefits. A monopolistic practice wrongly excused will
eventually yield to competition, though, as the monopolist's higher
prices attract rivalry."," This overstates the case: bad decisions do get

expunged or worked around, and monopolies can slow their eventual
destruction sometimes through anticompetitive methods (for example,
the De Beers diamond cartel) 3 and sometimes through the political

process (for example, AT&T). But there are sound economic reasons
to believe that the cost of prohibiting efficient practices outweighs the
costs of perpetuating monopolies.

41 We borrow the colorful acquittal/conviction terminology from the criminal context, even
though it is technically incorrect.
42 Easterbrook, 63 Tex L Rev at 15 (cited in note 8). See also Barry Wright Corp v ITT
Grinnell Corp, 724 F2d 227,234 (1st Cir 1983) ("[W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent
that authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price competition."); Ronald A. Cass and Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S
Cal L Rev 657,701-02 (2001):

Competition from existing firms provides another constraint on false acquittal costs .... If
there are existing firms outside of the cartel that are operating in the same market, we
should expect them to take advantage of the cartel's output-restraining policy in order to
expand their businesses.... A dominant firm that consistently charges monopoly prices will
attract entrants to its market.
43 See Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 133, 519
(Pearson 4th ed 2005) (describing the success of the De Beers diamond cartel).
44 See Paul W. MacAvoy and Kenneth Robinson, Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The
First Year of the AT&T Divestiture,2 Yale J Reg 225, 260-61 (1985) (suggesting that AT&T had
benefited from "substantial state-by-state regulatory agency support" prior to divestiture).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[72:73

TABLE 1
Possible Errors in the Antitrust Assessment of Business Practices

Harmful to
competition

Not harmful to
competition

Illegal

Legal

Percent of cases
correctly condemning
anticompetitive
practices

Percent of cases
falsely absolving
anticompetitive
practices

Percent of cases
falsely condemning
legitimate practices

Percent of cases
correctly absolving
legitimate practices

If an anticompetitive business practice is mistakenly permitted,
the resulting monopoly profits attract competition and new entrants,
at least in the long run. We are not suggesting that competition cures
all anticompetitive ills-only that the forces of competition, and creative destruction, provide some limitation on the magnitude and duration of monopoly profits. The monopoly or near-monopoly positions
of firms such as General Motors (automobiles), IBM (computers),
RCA (television sets), Kodak (photographic film), Xerox (photocopiers), U.S. Steel (finished steel), and Harley-Davidson (motorcycles)
were not ephemeral but not permanent either.5
By contrast, market forces play little corrective role for procompetitive business practices deemed anticompetitive. We would expect
that the ease with which plaintiffs won predatory pricing cases before
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co, Ltd v Zenith Radio Corp" and
Brooke Group tempered price competition by firms with significant
market power, and that the per se rule against tying has resulted in
many firms with market power being advised by their lawyers against
realizing the efficiencies that are obtainable from tying. Moreover, by

45

See Richard T. Pascale, Perspectiveson Strategy: The Real Story Behind Honda's Success,

26 Cal Mgmt Rev 47, 58 (1984) (identifying the declining market share of industry leaders between 1962 and 1982). See also Howard A. Shelanski and J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture
in Network Industries,68 U Chi L Rev 1, 14 (2001) (recognizing IBM's change in position from
"the undisputed market leader" to "just one of several strong competitors").
46
475 US 574 (1986) (requiring a plaintiff charging price predation to proffer a motive for
the charged conduct in order to survive summary judgment).
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restraining legitimate acts, antitrust laws reduce the value of being a

legitimate market leader-the goal that drives innovation.4 7
D.

Design of Legal Rules
Consider a spectrum of rules for challenging market practices
that ranges from pro-plaintiff to pro-defendant. Increasing the hurdle
for plaintiffs makes it harder to conclude that a practice is anticompetitive and therefore decreases the percentage of false convictions
and increases the percentage of false acquittals. Error costs vary as we

move across this spectrum. From society's perspective, the best rule on
this spectrum is the one that minimizes the expected cost of errors.
This cost is a function of the likelihood of error and the cost of each
type of error.
Consider first how legal rules can be designed to minimize the
likelihood of error. The total proportion of cases that are erroneously

decided is the sum of the percentages in the top right and lower left
boxes in Table 1. Now, consider the implications of our presumptions
for choosing a legal rule. Our priors tell us that practices, such as tying
or exclusive dealing, that are commonly used by competitive firms as

well as by firms with market power, are generally procompetitive. This
means that most cases involving such practices belong in the bottom
row (that is, not harmful to competition). In this situation, it is better,
all else being equal, to choose a stricter standard, lowering the rate of
false convictions, while accepting an increase in the rate of false ac-

quittals. Intuitively, if most of the cases involve permissible business
practices, the error rate in evaluating those cases is more important, as
they result in a greater number of errors.0
47
That is why both EU and U.S. antitrust laws do not condemn the mere possession of
monopoly. For instance, the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Verizon Communications
Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP noted:

The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The
opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power
will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.
540 US 398,407 (2004).
48
A numerical example may be instructive. Suppose forty cases involve permissible practices and twenty cases involve anticompetitive practices. And suppose that the error rate for both
types of cases is 10 percent at the existing legal standard. There will thus be on average four false
convictions (10 percent of forty) and two false acquittals (10 percent of twenty), for a total of six
erroneously decided cases. Suppose we can move to a stricter standard that lowers the error rate
in assessing permissible practices to 5 percent while increasing the error rate in assessing anticompetitive practices to 15 percent. (The error rates for false convictions and false acquittals do
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Another important factor in choosing the right legal standard in
an error-cost framework is the relative social cost of false convictions
and false acquittals. (We implicitly assumed that they were identical in
the example above.) When the social cost of false convictions is large
compared to the social cost of false acquittals, as our presumptions
imply, error-cost minimization requires a stricter standard.
Given our presumptions about efficiency, anticompetitive intent
and effects, and error costs, the legal rule that minimizes the expected
cost of false convictions and acquittals will necessarily involve significant evidentiary hurdles to establishing that a unilateral practice by a
firm with market power is anticompetitive. In practice, such a rule can
be implemented by using a series of screens suggested by the economic literature.
Economics has not identified the necessary and sufficient conditions for any unilateral practice to be anticompetitive. But it has done
a better job at determining the necessary conditions that can be used
to screen out practices that could not be anticompetitive. When one
of those necessary conditions fails, we can assume that the practice is
not suspect.
Even if all the necessary conditions for anticompetitive effects
are met, we still have to balance these effects against possible procompetitive effects before concluding that the practice is anticompetinot, of course, necessarily trade off one-to-one as we change the legal rule. The example offered
here is for illustrative purposes.) Is this worthwhile? The number of false convictions decreases
to two (5 percent of forty) while the number of false acquittals increases to three (15 percent of
twenty), for a total of five errors, or one fewer than before. We have thereby decreased the total
number of errors by moving to a stricter standard because we lowered the error rate for those
practices that are most common.
We have greatly simplified the analysis here for expositional purposes. Table 1 is presented
in terms of outcomes of litigated cases. A more comprehensive analysis would have to also consider "errors" that do not get to court-there will be harmless practices that firms do not engage
in for fear of antitrust liability under the prevailing legal standard, as well as harmful practices
not litigated because potential plaintiffs do not believe their expected gain from litigation to be
positive under the prevailing legal standard. On a related note, we have to recognize that the
behavior of firms may change as legal rules change. Moving to a stricter legal standard may
encourage more anticompetitive behavior. For example, literal per se legality may result in firms
undertaking new forms of anticompetitive behavior that would easily be identified as anticompetitive if litigated.
49 In our experience, economists and regulators often use post-Chicago reasoning to motivate an anticompetitive claim but then ignore the necessary conditions that flow from the postChicago literature. The blocked merger of de Havilland and Aerospatiale is one example. Case
IV/M.53, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, Commission Decision of 2 Oct 1991, 34 Off J Eur
Communities (L 334) 42 (Dec 5, 1991) (blocking the proposed merger based on a contention
that it would lead to the merged firms occupying a dominant market position). See also Paul
Klemperer and A. Jorge Padilla, Do Firms' Product Lines Include Too Many Varieties?, 28
RAND J Econ 472, 482-83 (1997) (suggesting that a net welfare loss from the proposed de
Havilland/Aerospatiale merger would have been unlikely). Kodak, 504 US 451, is another example.
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tive overall. Indeed, it is important to consider efficiencies in the
analysis. A proper inquiry into efficiencies can be costly and time consuming and is accordingly best done for only those practices that pass
the earlier screens. For example, if a defendant lacks significant market power, economic theory says that it lacks the ability to cause consumer harm, so the inquiry should end there. Similarly, if a defendant's
tying arrangements or exclusive contracts do not actually foreclose
rivals, anticompetitive effects are also unlikely. Again, the inquiry
should be terminated.
The "predatory pricing test" prevailing in the United States since
Brooke Group is structured along the lines we have suggested. Two
screens are applied. First, one determines whether the prices are
below a reasonable measure of the seller's costs. Second, one asks
whether there is a "reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman
Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost
prices."'
This test fails to identify all possible price predation practices but
follows from the view that it is better to err by allowing some predatory pricing than to condemn some competitive pricing. The Supreme
Court has properly moved to a stricter standard for showing predation
because (a) setting prices low is a hallmark of competition (so that the
cost of falsely condemning legitimate price cutting is high) and (b)
successful predation is rare (so that the likelihood of false acquittals is
low)."

The European Court of Justice's "exceptional circumstances test"
utilized in Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission of the European Communities" (Magill) and
IMS Health GmbH & Co v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG" is also

structured this way. The court compels licensing of intellectual property only if (1) it is indispensable for firms if they are to compete in a
secondary market, (2) the failure to license the intellectual property
would eliminate competition in that secondary market, (3) the intelBrooke Group, 509 US at 224.
See, for example, John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting:The StandardOil (NJ.) Case, 1
J L & Econ 137 (1958); John R. Lott, Jr., Are Predatory Commitments Credible?:Who Should the
Courts Believe? (Chicago 1999) (suggesting that what competitors often claim is predation is
often just ordinary competition). For an alternative view, see Malcolm R. Burns, PredatoryPricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors,94 J Polit Econ 266 (1986) (arguing that predation
reduces the cost to a firm of acquiring its competitors).
52
1995 ECR 1-743, 785 (Court of Justice Apr 6, 1995) (joining Cases C-241/91P and C242/91P) (holding that in exceptional circumstances, the refusal to grant an intellectual property
license to a competitor can be an abuse of a dominant position).
53 Case C-418/01, 2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 166 (Court of Justice Apr 29, 2004) (refining
the holding in Magill).
50

51
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lectual property is needed to create a new product for which there is
likely consumer demand, and (4) there is no objective justification for
refusing to license it.' We have argued elsewhere that these conditions
limit compulsory licensing to cases in which the prospective social
benefits are so large that they offset the chilling effect on incentives to
innovate."
Both the predatory pricing test and the exceptional circumstances
test can be viewed as "modified per se legality" rules. The practices
(pricing low, refusing to license a competitor) are presumed to be legal
even for firms with monopoly power unless the plaintiff can make a
very compelling case. Not surprisingly, there have been no successful
prosecutions of predatory pricing claims in the United States since
Brooke Group, and only one successful attempt to compel licensing of
intellectual property under EU law (the licensing of television listings
sought by Magill)."
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR TYING DOCTRINE

Tying was long treated as a per se offense in the United States. In
an early decision that epitomizes the pre-Chicago approach, Justice
Frankfurter wrote that tying agreements "serve hardly any purpose
beyond the suppression of competition. ' 7 Then in 1984, the Supreme
Court came close to eliminating the per se rule in Jefferson Parish;
four justices advocated a rule of reason. But the majority decided, "It
is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question
the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable
'
risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se.
Instead the Court required that a tying allegation pass several
screens before being considered illegal on its face--a modified per se
illegality standard. Tying is also an abuse of dominance under Article
82 of the European Communities Treaty.59 The European approach is

54
Id. See also Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, and A. Jorge Padilla, The Logic and
Limits of the "Exceptional Circumstances Test" in Magill and IMS Health (working paper Sept

2004).
55 See Ahlborn, Evans, and Padilla, Logic and Limits (cited in note 54). The Supreme
Court also seems to have moved to a modified per se legality standard for the refusal to share
property. See Trinko, 540 US 398.
56
Magill, 1995 ECR 1-743 at 785 (finding that a compulsory license was "essential in order
to maintain effective competition").
57 StandardOil Co v United States, 337 US 293,305-06 (1949).
58 Jefferson Parish,466 US at 9.
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establish59
ing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Art 82,40 Off J Eur Communities (C
340) 147 (Oct 2,1997).
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similar in many respects to the U.S. approach, and we assume the two
are identical for the purposes of this discussion.'
Courts and enforcement agencies have never taken Justice Frankfurter's condemnation literally.6' If they did, they would be deluged
with cases, and the economy would grind to a halt. For tying is pervasive, and, as we discuss below, there is seldom a principled basis for
distinguishing ties that fail the modified per se illegality standard from
ones that are never challenged.
Yet tying claims can have profound economic effects. In April
2003, for instance, MasterCard and Visa settled an antitrust case in
which a certified class of some five million merchants claimed that the
payment card associations had illegally tied merchant acceptance of
their debit cards to acceptance of their credit cards. After a district
court found on summary judgment that the associations failed some of
the criteria set forth in Jefferson Parish,6' the associations agreed to
allow merchants to accept credit and debit independently and to pay
$3 billion in damages. And in March 2004, the European Commission
found that Microsoft committed a tying violation by failing to market
a version of its Windows PC operating system without media player
technology.' Microsoft's ability to include and integrate new features,
beyond media player technology, in its operating system would be affected significantly if the European courts affirm the Commission's
analysis.6'

60 See Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, and A. Jorge Padilla, The Antitrust Economics of
Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality, 49 Antitrust Bull 287, 315-18 (2004) (noting that U.S. and
EC tying law "use[] almost the same analytical framework" but that current EC competition law
more closely resembles a per se rule).
61 For an overview of the Supreme Court's positions in tying cases throughout the past
century, see Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements:Antitrust as History,
69 Minn L Rev 1013 (1985).
62 See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 4965 (ED
NY). The first author was a consultant to Visa U.S.A. in this matter.
63 The payments are to be made over ten years, with a present discounted value of approximately $2.2-$2.6 billion. See Howard H. Chang, David S. Evans, and Richard Schmalensee,
The Retailer Class Action Case Against the Card Associations,2 Payment Card Econ Rev 123,126
(2004).
64 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission Decision of 24 Mar 2004, online at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf
(visited Dec
10, 2004). Microsoft has appealed this decision to the Court of First Instance (CFI). Microsoft
Corp v Commission, Case T-201/04 (Court of First Instance 2004). The appeal is still pending.
Both authors made written and oral submissions to the Commission on behalf of Microsoft
during the investigation as well as to the CFI on Microsoft's motion for annulment.
65 The Commission rejected a settlement negotiated by the staff because it wanted to
establish a legal precedent that would govern Microsoft's ability to integrate new features in
Windows. See Commissioner Monti's Statement on Microsoft (Mar 18, 2004), online at
http://europa.eu.intlrapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/365&format (visited Dec 10,
2004) (noting that a precedent with "clear principles" would be beneficial to consumers and
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Today, both the law and the economics of tying are best described
as confused. There is little support among economists for the modified
6
States and Europe
per se illegality standard applied in the United
since it does not correspond to any theory that could be used to distinguish procompetitive from anticompetitive tying. Yet economics
has not provided sharp tests for distinguishing anticompetitive from
procompetitive tying that could provide the courts with clear guid6 This is fertile ground for the neo-Chicago approach proposed in
ance.
this Essay.
A.

Prior Beliefs on Efficiencies

Tying covers a range of circumstances. Consider components A
and B, which firms could sell separately or as a single product AB. Tying occurs in an economic sense when firms offer AB but do not sell
one or both components separately. In Jefferson Parish,A was hospital surgical services and B was anesthesiology services. Patients buying
surgical services were not permitted to bring in their own anesthesiologists.6
Tying, in the economic sense of the term, is everywhere. Cars only
come with air conditioners, mobile phones with ring tones, newspapers
with arts sections, law school curricula with courses on torts, computer
operating systems with internet-communication protocols, and cameras with built-in flashes. In some cases consumers can only get the
bundle (newspapers with arts sections), while in others they can get
the bundle (mobile phones with ring tones) as well as the components
(extra ring tones). Sometimes the components are available from different suppliers than the bundle.
There are obvious business reasons why firms offer A and B together. These include benefits of integration, economies of scope in
distributing products, packaging cost savings, reduced transaction costs
for businesses and consumers, and increased reliability for consumers.
A firm that offers AB would only sell A and B separately as well if
there were sufficient demand to cover the costs. If the fixed costs of
offering B are high relative to the demand for B, a firm may decide to
offer only AB and A. It therefore ties the purchase of B to the purcompetition). See also Mark Landler, A Slayer of Monopolies, One Corporationat a Time, NY
Times C1 (Mar 25, 2004) (suggesting that Commissioner Monti's approach may have "brought
Europe closer to the United States in the way it prosecutes antitrust cases").
66 See, for example, Motta, Competition Policy at 467-68 (cited in note 10); Bork, The
Antitrust Paradoxat 372-75 (cited in note 6).
67
See, for example, Whinston, 15 J Econ Perspectives at 79 (cited in note 40) ("What is
striking about the area of exclusive contracts and tying, however, is how little the current literature tells us about what [the typical effects] are likely to be.").
68 Jefferson Parish,466 US at 7.
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chase of A. If consumers generally use A and B together, they may
find it is cheaper and more convenient to buy them together. Even if
the fixed costs of offering A and B separately are modest, if there are
few potential takers, firms will only offer AB. 9
Thus, while hard economic evidence is limited, casual empiricism
suggests that tying typically does yield efficiencies. And the fact that
tying persists in competitive markets suggests that it must result in
lower prices or better quality. These sources of efficiency remain, regardless of the degree of market power of the firm engaging in the
practice.
B.

Prior Beliefs on Anticompetitive Intent and Effect

As noted earlier, firms with a monopoly in X prefer that complementary product Y be supplied at the lowest possible price. They
will lose profits in the short run if they tie for any reason other than
efficiency. And they may lose profits in the long run, too, even if they
are able to use tying to inhibit competition.' °
Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman analyze the impact of tying to protect an initially monopolized market from competitive entry." In their model, entry takes more time in one market than the
other, and there are economies of scope from selling in both markets.
By reducing the profitability of being in one market only, tying may
deter entry in either or both markets.
This model, and similar ones, is useful in identifying the conditions necessary for tying to be a competitive problem. However, their
practical value is limited because the data is rarely adequate to determine whether a tie will actually reduce welfare. As Carlton and
Waldman note:
[T]rying to turn the theoretical possibility for harm ... into a pre-

scriptive theory of antitrust enforcement is a difficult task. For
example, the courts would have to weigh any potential efficiencies from the tie with possible losses due to foreclosure, which by
itself is challenging due to the difficulty of measuring both the
relevant efficiencies and the relevant losses.73

69
For a general discussion of the economic reasons for competitive tying, see Evans and
Salinger, 22 Yale J Reg (forthcoming 2005) (cited in note 35).
70 See Rey and Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure(cited in note 17).
71 See Carlton and Waldman, 33 RAND J Econ at 198-212 (cited in note 24).
72
Ahlborn, Evans, and Padilla present a structured rule of reason test that is based on the
necessary conditions for welfare-reducing tying found by Whinston, as well as Carlton and
Waldman. See Ahlborn, Evans, and Padilla, 49 Antitrust Bull at 330-36 (cited in note 60).
73 See Carlton and Waldman, 33 RAND J Econ at 215 (cited in note 24) (emphasis added).
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Tying may be used for the anticompetitive reasons described in
the post-Chicago literature. Or it could be used nefariously in ways
that economists have yet to imagine. However, a balanced reading of
the post-Chicago literature suggests that firms with the ability to tie
anticompetitively often do not have an incentive to do so, and those
with the incentive often fail to have the power to cause harm to competition." Our prior belief, therefore, is that firms generally engage in
tying because it is efficient.
C.

Prior Belief on Error Costs

Condemning procompetitive tying wipes out the efficiencies provided by tying in the cases considered by the courts, increases the likelihood that the courts will condemn similar tying arrangements in
other cases, and deters all firms from providing efficiencies through
tying arrangements that subsequently seem vulnerable to legal challenge. Conversely, the courts' failure to condemn anticompetitive tying
increases the likelihood that a firm with monopoly power in one market will obtain a monopoly in an adjacent market or perpetuate its
existing monopoly-in both cases restricting output and reducing economic efficiency. Moreover, other monopolies will not be deterred
from engaging in similar anticompetitive behavior, leading to additional losses.
It is not possible to compare these error costs precisely. However,
some limited insights into the likelihood and direction of errors comes
from a recent study by Barry Nalebuff and David Majerus.7" They reviewed eleven tying cases in the United States and Europe, assessing
the courts judged correctly.16 Nalebuff and Majerus are more
whether
disposed than we are to the view that tying is anticompetitive.77 There-

74 See Rey, Seabright, and Tirole, The Activities of a Monopoly Firm at *23 (cited in note
40) (suggesting that it might not be rational for a monopolist to "engage in anti-competitive
foreclosure of competitors in adjacent markets" because doing so will increase the cost to consumers of complementary products in the foreclosed market, thus reducing revenue from the
monopoly product).
75 Barry Nalebuff and David Majerus, Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects: Part 2-Case
Studies, DTI Economics Paper No 1 (Feb 2003).
76
While the report nominally contains thirteen separate cases, two are about different
aspects of the GE/Honeywell merger. Also, since one of the cases had not been decided when
the report was completed, we exclude it, leaving eleven cases. See id. See also David S. Evans, A.
Jorge Padilla, and Michael A. Salinger, A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and Analyzing
Legitimate Tying Cases, in European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is anAbuse of a Dominant Position? (Hart forthcoming) (using Nalebuff and Majerus's analysis to suggest that economic theory supports a rule of reason standard).
77 See generally Barry Nalebuff, Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects: Part1- Conceptual
Issues, DTI Economics Paper No 1, 9-12 (Feb 2003). See also Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an
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fore, they are more likely to conclude that tying is anticompetitive
than are those who share our prior beliefs about efficiencies and anticompetitive intent. Table 2 summarizes their conclusions.
TABLE

2

A Decision-Theoretic Perspective on Nalebuff and Majerus (2003)

Harmful
cometitoto
competition

Not harmful to
competition

Illegal

Legal

Four (36%)

None (0%)

Three (27%)

Four (36%)

This is a small sample. But it comprises the leading cases in the

United States and the European Union, and the authors' judgments
are striking. There are no instances in which the courts found that an
anticompetitive tying practice (by the authors' judgment) was legalthat is, there were no false acquittals. There are three instances in
which the courts found that a procompetitive tying practice was illegal-the rate of false convictions was therefore 27 percent." Assuming
that each type of error is equally costly-denote the error cost per
case by c-the expected error cost per case is 0.27c.
The distribution of cases in Table 2 suggests that existing tying
law does not come close to minimizing error costs." To see why, suppose we made the existing standard stricter, decreasing the likelihood
of false convictions by 20 percentage points while increasing the likelihood of false acquittals by 20 percentage points. This would result in

the error-cost matrix in Table 3.

Entry Barrier,119 Q J Econ 159, 183 (2004) (concluding that a monopolist "has incentives to
bundle, either as a way to achieve better price discrimination ... or to help save costs").
78 Evans, Padilla, and Salinger argue that the actual percentage of false convictions is
probably much higher. Evans, Padilla, and Salinger, A PragmaticApproach (cited in note 76).
79 Table 2 shows that of the eleven tying cases examined, 64 percent (7/11) were not harmful to competition and 36 percent (4/11) were harmful. For a harmful act, the existing standard
will correctly condemn it 100 percent (4/4) of the time and falsely exonerate it 0 percent of the
time (0/4). Similarly, for a nonharmful act, the existing modified per se illegality standard will
correctly exonerate it 57 percent (4/7) of the time and falsely condemn it 43 percent of the time
(3n).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[72:73

3
Error Costs Under a Stricter Legal Standard
TABLE

Illegal

7%

Harmful to
competition
Not harmful to
competition

Legal

15%

49%

Errors are now made 22 percent of the time (7 percent false acquittals plus 15 percent false convictions), so that the expected error
cost per case is lower under the new standard-0.22c compared to
0.27c. This calculation is only an illustration. But it does confirm our
intuition that because most cases involve harmless practices, we
should err toward a standard that is more likely to result in false acquittals than false convictions. Moreover, since we suspect that the
cost of false convictions is higher than the cost of false acquittals, the
illustration offers reasons to move toward an even stricter legal standard for condemning tying.
D.

Design of Legal Rules

Based on the prior beliefs outlined above, we can discard two extreme approaches for assessing tying practices. We can reject a per se
illegality standard-the pre-Chicago approach-on the grounds that
tying is generally procompetitive. While the Nalebuff-Majerus work
implies that two-thirds of the cases they examined involved practices
that were not harmful to competition, a per se illegality test would
result in all of them being condemned. We may also be able to reject,
although less confidently, a per se legality standard-the Chicago
School approach-on the grounds that tying could be used anticompetitively.nO The Nalebuff-Majerus results find that roughly one-third
of their cases involved anticompetitive ties.

80 If the cost of false convictions were substantially higher than the cost of false acquittals,
a per se legality rule might well be optimal under certain circumstances. With per se legality, the
four cases of anticompetitive tying in Table 2 from the Nalebuff-Majerus analysis would become
false acquittals (with no false convictions), compared to the three false convictions (with no false
acquittals) under prevailing legal standards. If false convictions were more than four-thirds as
costly as false acquittals, then a per se legality standard would be preferable. We also note that a
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Two other possible standards, which impose significant hurdles to
a finding of anticompetitive tying, are consistent with our approach to
the design of legal rules. A modified per se legality standard would
presume that tying is procompetitive unless the plaintiff offered compelling evidence that tying was used mainly to obtain or maintain a
monopoly. Such evidence would require a significant demonstration of
a causal link between the practice and a likely reduction in consumer
welfare. Tying could be found illegal only in exceptional circumstances."
Alternatively, a structured rule of reason approach would employ
a series of screens to focus only on tying practices that could plausibly
result in anticompetitive behavior. A plaintiff would need to show:
(1)

An anticompetitive effect is possible. A number of safe
harbors would allow ties where they are unlikely to be anticompetitive, such as cases in which the defendant lacked
market power in the tying product.

(2)

An anticompetitive effect is plausible. An economic theory
of anticompetitive effect must fit the facts of the case.
Offsetting efficiency benefits are insubstantial."

(3)
E.

The Role of Efficiencies in Choosing Between Standards

The choice between a structured rule of reason approach and
modified per se legality is difficult, and the best approach may depend
on the class of tying arrangements under consideration. A modified
per se legality rule will result in more false acquittals. The cost of false
acquittals must be compared to the cost of the additional administrative costs of screening as well as the costs of false convictions from
applying the structured analysis.
The structured rule of reason would be most useful in extreme
situations-that is, cases in which it is clear after the first few screens
that the alleged anticompetitive effects are highly implausible, but
there is convincing evidence supporting efficiency benefits. Or when
the tie survives the two first screens, and no efficiencies can be rigorously argued. Otherwise, it may prove inconclusive.
The efficiency properties of tying arrangements should thus play
a paramount role in the adoption of a standard. Evans and Salinger
find in their study of competitive tying that efficiencies are likely present in the cases they examine-in part because the structure of the
complete analysis would also have to consider a range of factors not included here, such as "errors" that do not get to court and the impact of changing legal standards on firms' behavior.
81 See Ahlborn, Evans, and Padilla, 49 Antitrust Bull at 319-20 (cited in note 60).
82
Id at 329-36.
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markets makes other explanations implausible-but are difficult to
quantify. The same is likely true for tying by firms with market power.
To minimize errors, Evans and Salinger suggest that defendants
should bear the initial burden of offering efficiency explanations for
their practices, but that plaintiffs should bear the burden of showing
that the efficiency explanations are invalid.
Efficiencies are apparent in several leading tying cases, but with
one exception their presence was ignored or rebuffed by the courts. In
the Jefferson Parish district court decision, 8 the court agreed with the
defendant that the anesthesiology system in place was efficient because it provided twenty-four-hour coverage, and a closed group of
physicians, nurses, and technicians provided for better standardization
84
of procedures, monitoring of staff, and maintenance of equipment.
That seems plausible to us and consistent with transaction cost economics."' But the Fifth Circuit rebuffed it, noting that anesthesiologists
testified they would have been willing to provide twenty-four-hour
coverage without a contract and that the defendants had not adequately demonstrated that other alleged efficiencies existed and could
not be achieved through less restrictive means."
The Supreme Court never seriously considered the efficiency defense in Jefferson Parish,finding for the hospital on the grounds that it
lacked market power.89 By contrast, it recognized in Times-Picayune
Publishing Co v United States9° that a newspaper created efficiencies
by requiring advertisers to place ads in both the morning and evening

83
Evans and Salinger, 22 Yale J Reg (forthcoming 2005) (cited in note 35). The D.C. Circuit concluded that the single-product test in Jefferson Parish was a proxy for determining
whether there are efficiencies. United States v Microsoft Corp, 253 F3d 34, 87 (DC Cir 2001). The
economics of tying explains why that is not correct. Consider a situation in which A is the tying
product, B is the tied product, and AB is the combination. The Jefferson Parish test looks at
whether there is separate demand for B. That focuses on the wrong question. Tying is a violation
because the firm did not offer the tying product A in addition to the tied combination AB. The
question is therefore whether the failure to offer that separate choice (that is, not offering A
separately and allowing customers to supply their own B) is driven by efficiency reasons. Many
competitive products would fail the single-product test because they consist of bundles (AB) for
which components or spare parts are available separately.
84 See Evans and Salinger, 22 Yale J Reg (forthcoming 2005) (cited in note 35).
85
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86 Jefferson Parish,513 F Supp at 540.
87
For a discussion of the transaction cost economics of firms, see Joskow, 18 J L, Econ, &
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Theory and Practice54-57 (Addison-Wesley 1998).
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editions.9 Nevertheless, the Court's main reason for ruling in favor of
the newspaper was lack of market power in the advertising market.9
In EU tying cases, there has been no successful defense based on
efficiencies, although there have also been few cases.93 For example, in
Eurofix-Bauco v Hilti, the defendant argued that the reliability and
safety of its nail gun system was enhanced by tying the sale of nail
guns to nails. 5 The European Commission rejected Hilti's justification
on the grounds that there were less restrictive means to the same
ends." The European courts affirmed the Commission's decision.
However, as Nalebuff and Majerus observe, Hilti's efficiency justification is more plausible than the Commission's theory of anticompetitive behavior." Hilti customers also had to purchase Hilti cartridges
over which Hilti had intellectual property rights that precluded entry
from competing suppliers. Hilti could earn all that it could earn
through pricing its guns and cartridges and therefore had no reason to
seek a monopoly in nails. It is the poster child for the singlemonopoly-profit theorem.
CONCLUSION

Our proposed approach provides a unifying framework for
evaluating unilateral practices. It draws on research by both Chicago
and post-Chicago scholars, and is consistent with some of the seminal
court decisions in the United States and the European Union. While
this approach imposes some coherence on antitrust law, it also offers
some flexibility. First, it does not require that the same form of rule
apply to every practice. Prior judgments on the procompetitive and
anticompetitive uses of a practice can influence the choice of rule as
well as the screens used to minimize error costs. Second, the same analytic framework could be used for different presumptions. Indeed, this
approach offers a rigorous way of analyzing whether and to what extent antitrust rules should vary across jurisdictions, practices, and time.
It is unrealistic to ask economics to provide off-the-shelf guidance for the myriad situations encountered in real-life antitrust. But
economics could be made more useful in separating good from bad.
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Although the game-theoretic approach embraced by the post-Chicago
literature is valuable in helping to understand business practices, it has
yet to demonstrate a capacity to produce what we would call identification theorems-useful descriptions of the circumstances determining whether a practice is procompetitive or anticompetitive.
Kovacic and Shapiro conclude their survey of the first century of
antitrust by noting, "The availability of new data sources like electronic point-of-purchase data, the refinement of flexible gametheoretic models, and the new emphasis on innovation assures that
robust arguments over the proper content of competition policy will
flourish in the 21st century."98 Yet in the five years since those words
were published, we have seen very little progress in the theoretical
literature that would help regulators and courts separate procompetitive from anticompetitive behavior.
The neo-Chicago approach described in this Essay points to a research agenda for economists that could help provide the guidance
now lacking. Economists need to better understand the extent to
which nondominant firms engage in the kinds of business practices
that become suspect when they are used by firms with market power,
and why competitive firms engage in these practices. This will help to
determine whether there are plausible efficiencies from those practices, as well as to inform judgments about the likely importance of
those efficiencies. More generally, economists need to develop theory
and empirical practice that can help assess the cost and likelihood of
errors (of both kinds) in assessing the consequences of unilateral
business behavior. It may be possible to develop more identification
theorems that can be used to separate procompetitive from anticompetitive practices.
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